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ABSTRACT
In 2009, the United States and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) concluded a nuclear
cooperation agreement which contained a commitment on the part of the U.A.E. not to
enrich uranium through its own domestic programs. Dubbed the “Gold Standard” of
nuclear nonproliferation by the Obama administration, such an accomplishment has not
been repeated in nuclear agreements between 2009 and 2015. This paper examines
American nuclear cooperation negotiations following the establishment of the “Gold
Standard,” and argues that the rapid reversal of American negotiating policy toward
enrichment and reprocessing technologies will hinder U.S. nonproliferation goals going
forward.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2009, the United States and the United Arab Emirates concluded a nuclear
cooperation agreement which contained one very unusual clause: the United Arab
Emirates would agree not to enrich uranium through domestic programs, requiring it
instead to import enriched uranium from abroad. This commitment has since been
referred to as the “Gold Standard” of nuclear nonproliferation. In the nearly six years
since that agreement was signed, the United States has embarked on several nuclear
cooperation negotiations with a variety of countries around the world. The “Gold
Standard” has not been achieved in any of these subsequent negotiations.
At the conclusion of its negotiations, Vietnam agreed to a less-strict alternative.
This was partly an outcome of the United States’ own choosing, having determined in
2012 that it should approach restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing on a case-bycase basis. Vietnam set the “Silver Standard” in 2014 when it made a political, but not
legally binding, pledge to forego enrichment capacity.
Even among countries with which the United States maintains positive relations
and considers to be of minimal proliferation risk, a non-enrichment clause is a unique
feature of a nuclear cooperation agreement. It is unlikely that if a country poses a
significant military or proliferation threat it will sign a legally-binding non-enrichment
clause, particularly if such a clause is rare among close American cooperative partners.
This makes the “Gold Standard” of nuclear nonproliferation an elusive goal, but one
which has been proven to be obtainable.

1

By its very nature, a nuclear cooperation agreement cannot be undertaken solely
by one country. It is a partnership wherein two countries agree that the supply of nuclear
materials, technologies, and facilities by one to the other is beneficial to the advancement
of the interests of both parties. The United States has signed nuclear cooperation
agreements – called “123 Agreements” based on the requirements of Section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 – with more than fifty countries and entities around the
world, either individually or through an agreement with bodies such as Euratom. 1
In the United States, these cooperation agreements are essential legal frameworks
for American businesses to export nuclear technologies and materials. The drawback is
the dual-use nature of nuclear material; sensitive nuclear technologies and processes
inherently run the risk of being applied to advance nuclear weapons programs. Although
multilateral regimes and international treaties attempt to limit the spread of dangerous
nuclear technologies, the risk of proliferation remains the utmost concern when entering
into an agreement with a new partner.
There are warning signs that a partner country may be interested in a nuclear
program that is less than peaceful. A fully self-contained nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure
is expensive and cumbersome to develop, and is simply not economically feasible for
nations operating a small number of standard civilian nuclear reactors. Research reactors,
which required the more dangerous high-enriched uranium during the Cold War era, can
be modified with today’s technology to operate on the same, more proliferation-resistant,
fuel used in civilian nuclear reactors. However, the presence of such warning signs does
not automatically mean that a country has begun developing nuclear weapons. A

1

Issues & Policy, “Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” Nuclear Energy Institute, 2015. Accessed August
28, 2015, http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/Exports-Trade/Nuclear-Cooperation-Agreements.
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perceived scarcity in supply or even the choice of a nation to exercise its right under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue civilian nuclear programs are examples of a
valid justification to pursue either a self-contained nuclear fuel cycle or a research reactor
which requires high-enriched uranium fuel.
As such, a nuclear cooperation agreement undertaken by the United States is
traditionally a tightly-written document designed to ensure that the United States is not
inadvertently contributing to military programs. Much like an understanding of the
nuclear fuel cycle, the framework of nuclear cooperation agreements must be examined
to appreciate the significance of the “Gold Standard.” Furthermore, agreements in this
area signed after the “Gold Standard” are essential to tracing the evolution of U.S.
attempts at advancing its nonproliferation agenda. With this context, the specific nuclear
cooperation agreements signed between the United States and the United Arab Emirates,
and between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, may be examined
to build a better understanding of how the agreements evolved.
Finally, a return to the legal basis of nuclear cooperation agreements emanating
from the United States will be shown through attempts by Congress to mandate stricter
nonproliferation controls in the agreement framework. Despite multiple attempts over
several years and congresses, Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has proven
highly difficult to amend. As with all complex issues, this stems from a wide variety of
factors, but likely includes concerns that overly restrictive agreements will make the
United States less widely used among international suppliers, thus undermining U.S.
commercial interests and eroding American influence in the global nonproliferation
environment.

3

The end result has been that through half a decade of nuclear negotiations, the
United States has moved progressively farther away from the “Gold Standard.” In so
doing, the United States has eroded its position that the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons does not grant signatory states the inherent right to enrich uranium. It
has similarly sent a signal that civilian infrastructures capable of producing nuclear
weapons components, such as enrichment facilities, are not inherently dangerous
technologies.
This is most easily exemplified with the recently-concluded Iran Nuclear
Negotiations. Although not a 123 Agreement, it nonetheless falls within the scope of
these frameworks due to its effects on Iran’s civilian nuclear enterprise. The Iran deal
allows Iran to enrich uranium, which is completely contrary to the “Gold Standard” of
nonproliferation; if countries are led to believe that advanced nuclear infrastructures will
create more favorable negotiating positions between them and the U.S., then they are
unlikely to pursue civil nuclear cooperation with the U.S. while their programs are still in
their infancy.

4

THE DRAW OF NUCLEAR POWER

Energy and economy are very closely linked. The United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) described in a 2007 report “strong and proven
empirical positive correlations between energy and economic growth, and between
electricity use and economic development.”2 Similarly, the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) notes that “severe energy shortages limit growth
prospects and impact every aspect of life from food production to access to healthcare
and education and overall business activity.” 3
It should come as little surprise, therefore, to find that the countries with the
highest GDP4 and GDP per capita5 in 2012 also had 100% access to electricity. 6 The
methods for generating this vital electricity vary to an extent in and among countries, but
hydrocarbons (oil, coal, and natural gas) currently dominate the energy industry: the EIA
reports that 80% of power generated globally comes from such sources. Nuclear energy,
in contrast, accounts for a mere 8% of globally-installed capacity. 7

2

Staff Working Paper, “Energy, Industry Modernization and Poverty Reduction: A Review and Analysis of
Current Policy Thinking,” Research and Statistics Branch, United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, June 2007. Accessed November 4, 2015,
http://www.unido.org//fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Research_and_statistics/Branch_publications/Re
search_and_Policy/Files/Working_Papers/2007/WP062007%20%20Energy,%20industry%20modernization%20and%20poverty%20reduction.pdf, p. v.
3
U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, “Power Africa.” Accessed November 4, 2015,
https://www.opic.gov/opic-action/power-africa.
4
World Bank, “Data: GDP (Current $USD).”Accessed November 4, 2015,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012.
5
World Bank, “Data: GDP Per Capita (Current $USD).” Accessed November 4, 2015,
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012.
6
World Bank, “Data: Access to Electricity (% of Population).” Accessed November 4, 2015,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2012.
7
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2015 with Projections to 2040,” U.S.
Department of Energy, April 2015. Accessed November 4, 2015,
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282015%29.pdf, p. 15.
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Barriers to Nuclear Energy
There are a number of reasons why nuclear energy comprises such a small portion
of global generating capacity (although this number is higher in individual countries such
as France, where nuclear power plants generate 77% of the country’s electrical output), 8
but two will receive particular mention. Nuclear power plants are, first and foremost,
costly to build and require a great deal of infrastructure and intellectual capital to operate.
Second, in the unlikely event that a nuclear reactor suffers a catastrophic failure, the
resulting damage to the community could potentially be devastating.
Nuclear power’s cost barrier represents a significant financial burden to the
private operators of these plants. The construction of a 1,100 MW second unit at the V.C.
Summer nuclear power plant in South Carolina, for example, is expected to cost $6.8
billion before it opens for operation in 2019. 9 To contrast, a 1,200 MW combined-cycle
natural gas power plant completed in Florida, which began operation in 2013, was built at
a cost of approximately $860 million. 10
Compounding the steep capital costs is the time required to go from the beginning
of construction to commercial operation; a 2004 report from the Brookings Institution
identified that “the average lag from groundbreaking to operation had reached twelve
years” in the U.S. by 1990 (compared to an average of seven years for nuclear power

8

U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Pages: France,” U.S. Department of Energy,
September 2015. Accessed November 4, 2015,
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=FRA
9
Nuclear Power International, “Summer Nuclear Power Expansion to Cost $6.8bn, Finish in 2019 &
2020,” Power Engineering, March 13, 2015. Accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.powereng.com/articles/2015/03/summer-nuclear-power-expansion-to-cost-6-8bn-finish-in-2019-2020.html.
10
Russel Ray, “A Report on Combined Cycle Projects in North America,” Power Engineering, February 3,
2015. Accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.power-eng.com/articles/2014/02/a-report-on-combinedcycle-projects-in-north-america.html
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plants built before 1979).11 This represents a significant period of time during which the
power station cannot recover its initial capital cost, which in turn means that an entity
must be certain that a viable market exists a decade before the expected operational date
of the nuclear power plant – and that the market will persist for decades afterward. There
must also be a degree of certainty that a multi-billion-dollar facility will be allowed to
operate once it reaches completion.
A second significant barrier to nuclear reactors is an investment climate which
currently fears the results of a catastrophic failure of nuclear facilities. While documented
critical failures at such facilities are very few in number, the potential damage that could
result from a nuclear accident is nonetheless of sufficient magnitude that even a relatively
mild incident can have far-reaching effects on the global nuclear industry.
The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi incident in Japan, for example, saw a massive
earthquake trigger a tsunami which flooded backup generators designed to keep the
plant’s nuclear fuel cool even in the event the reactors themselves needed to be shut
down. Three reactors subsequently melted down, leaking radioactive material over a
significant radius around the power plant.12 Following the accident at Fukushima,
countries across the world saw a significant decrease in the number of applications for
new nuclear facilities. Japan itself reduced its nuclear capacity to zero, although it does
plan to restart parts of its nuclear fleet by the end of 2015. 13

11

Pietro S. Nivola, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy in the United States,” Brookings Institution,
September 2004. Accessed November 4, 2015,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2004/09/environment-nivola.
12
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on NRC Response to Lessons Learned from
Fukushima,” February 9, 2015. Accessed November 4, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/japan-events.html.
13
Candace Dunn, “Japan Plans to Restart Some Nuclear Plants in 2015 After Fukushima Shutdown,”
Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, February 11, 2015. Accessed November
4, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19951.
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Germany, like Japan, announced the end of its nuclear program following the
Fukushima disaster. Unlike Japan, Germany’s decision involves phasing out its current
nuclear fleet through the year 2022, at which point no new nuclear facilities are
anticipated to be approved. Prior to the shutdown, nuclear power represented
approximately 15% of German electrical capacity. 14
Fukushima is not the first incident in a nuclear power plant to cause global
concern over the safety of nuclear energy. In 1979, in Pennsylvania, Three Mile Island
Unit 2 suffered a partial meltdown due to a malfunction in the plant’s cooling system.
While the average radiation exposure to the approximately 2 million individuals in the
community was less than the exposure of a medical x-ray, the plant was shuttered and the
event prompted significant changes to the operation and management of American
nuclear power plants.15
Seven years later, the fatal accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
released significant radiation which threatened millions of residents in Ukraine, Russia,
and Belarus. 16 It is the first and only (to date) accident at a nuclear power plant which
resulted in the loss of human life, and the only power plant meltdown which resulted in
exposure to radiation sufficient to affect the health of plant workers.17 These three
incidents describe the dangers associated with fissile materials, but over the lifetime of

14

World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Germany,” November 2015. Accessed November 4,
2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Germany/.
15
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” December
12, 2014. Accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mileisle.html.
16
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident,”
December 12, 2014. Accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheets/chernobyl-bg.html.
17
World Nuclear Association, “Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors,” August 2015. Accessed November 6,
2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-powerreactors/.
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the global nuclear industry such events have proven to be rare – just three such incidents
during “160,000 reactor-years of operation.”18

Benefits of Nuclear Energy
Civilian nuclear power has a proven track record of reliability. It has consistently
been among the cheaper energy alternatives to operate, and its outputs are less harmful to
the environment compared to hydrocarbon sources. Each of these is a significant draw to
American companies and to the international community.
Due in part to the inherent hazards associated with nuclear energy, and also as a
result of lessons learned over decades of operating these plants, safeguards and protective
measures in the nuclear industry have grown to address potential failures before they
occur. This includes multilateral organizations, such as the IAEA’s safety standards,
which “reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for
protecting people and the environment” from the use of fissile materials. 19 It also includes
bilateral initiatives, where one country makes the knowledge of its nuclear regulatory
authority (such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC) available to ensure
that the best possible practices are used throughout the world. For example, the NRC is
“actively involved” in assisting foreign states with the decommissioning of nuclear
reactors, and maintains “arrangements with many foreign countries which include
import/export, expert advice, information exchanges, and site visits.” 20

18

Ibid.
International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safety Standards,” December 9, 2014. Accessed November
10, 2015, http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/.
20
Giorgio N. Gnugnoli, “International Decommissioning Regulatory Initiatives and U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Involvement,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 2005. Accessed
November 10, 2015, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052360193.pdf.
19

9

With its long record of reliability, countries which pursue nuclear power are able
to take advantage of its sizeable environmentally-friendly attributes. In 2004, for
example, the U.S. power generating sector reduced CO2 emissions by 282 million metric
tons. Improvements to, and increased generating capacity from, nuclear power plants
accounted for 54% of these carbon emissions reductions. 21 This is because nuclear power
plants produce neither CO2 nor other air pollutants as a direct byproduct of their power
generating functions.22
The effect of humans on the environment is a particularly sensitive topic in 2015,
so much so that the Department of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review directly
lists climate change as a potential threat to future missions. 23 As such, nuclear power’s
low carbon footprint makes it an attractive option for the international community. 24
Finally, despite the significant capital required to build a nuclear power station,
the operating costs of the plant are among the lowest of any source of electricity. For
example, the average cost of electricity to the American residential consumer was just
over $0.12 per kilowatt hour in 2015.25 Nuclear energy in the U.S., to contrast, was most
recently estimated by the EIA as having a cost of approximately $0.09 per kilowatt hour;

21

Power PartnersSM, “The Power PartnersSM Annual Report,” January 2007. Accessed November 10, 2015,
http://uspowerpartners.org/Reports&pubs/PowerPartners%28sm%29-AnnualReport-Jan2007.pdf, p. 3.
22
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Nuclear Explained: Nuclear Power and the Environment,”
U.S. Department of Energy, December 15, 2014. Accessed November 10, 2015,
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nuclear_environment.
23
U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” March 4, 2014. Accessed November
10, 2015, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, p. vi.
24
World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear is Part of the Solution for Fighting Climate Change,” November 5,
2015. Accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.worldnuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/Features/Climate_Change/Nuclear4Climate%20Position%20Paper.pdf, p. 1.
25
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Electric Power Monthly with Data for August 2015,” U.S.
Department of Energy, October 2015. Accessed November 10, 2015,
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/pdf/epm.pdf, table 5.3.
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so-called “clean coal” power plants were estimated at $0.14, and solar at $0.11 after the
application of government subsidies. 26
That nuclear energy is a cheap generating source (despite the significant
construction costs) is a highly attractive trait to developing economies. The National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association, a service organization for a network of energy
providers across 47 states, released a study in July of 2015 detailing the effects of energy
prices on the American economy. This study predicted that a mere 10% increase in
electricity prices across its represented demographic (which primarily supplies
agriculture and manufacturing) between 2020 and 2040 will cost the U.S. a cumulative
$2.8 trillion in lost GDP.27 Although the study did not weigh in on the economic benefits
of reducing electricity costs, it notes that increased costs of electricity “reduce the overall
economic activity” of a region.28 This is consistent with the case of Germany, where
rising costs of energy due to an increased focus on renewable sources, combined with the
shuttering of nuclear power post-Fukushima, harmed German economic competitiveness.
The German government went so far as to revise green energy subsidy laws to combat
escalating energy surcharges.29
Although nuclear energy is by no means the only solution to environmental
concerns and rising electricity costs, it is a competitive tool which is recognized
internationally as one means to provide reliable electricity at a relatively low cost to the
26

U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New
Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2015,” U.S. Department of Energy, June 3, 2015.
Accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm.
27
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, “Affordable Electricity: Rural America’s Economic
Lifeline,” July 27, 2015. Accessed November 3, 2015, http://www.nreca.coop/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/Affordable-Electricity-Rural-Americas-Economic-Lifeline.pdf, p. 1.
28
Ibid.,p. 11.
29
Matthew Karnitschnig, “Germany’s Expensive Gamble on Renewable Energy,” Wall Street Journal,
August 26, 2014. Accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanys-expensive-gambleon-renewable-energy-1409106602.
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consumer. The proof is in continued demand for nuclear power: outside of the United
States, 60 nuclear power plants are under construction; 160 have either been planned or
ordered; and 299 have been proposed. Assuming the current rate of expansion, the 437
nuclear power plants currently in existence will have more than doubled to 983 by the
year 2030. In 18 of the countries scheduled to receive these, no nuclear power plants
currently exist.30
According to the Congressional Research Service, approximately “90% of the
world’s existing commercial reactors (all except heavy water reactors and some gascooled reactors) require enriched uranium fuel.” 31 New nuclear reactors are unlikely to
deviate from this norm, and as such the demand for enriched uranium fuel is likely to
grow along with the industry.

Nuclear Fuel Cycle
The full nuclear fuel cycle is an infrastructure- and capital-heavy construct which
takes raw uranium to be processed into nuclear fuel. An overview of the process is useful
for highlighting this fact, and shows why enrichment and reprocessing capabilities may
be attractive to some countries to increase the security of their nuclear fuel supply. This
capability, referred to as having a “closed fuel cycle,”32 allows for spent nuclear fuel to
be reprocessed and reused for the purpose of operating a nuclear power plant.

30

"World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements," World Nuclear Association, April 21, 2015.
Accessed May 20, 2015.
31
Mary Beth Nikitin et al. “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global
Access to Nuclear Power,” Congressional Research Service (CRS Report no. RL34234), October 19, 2012,
p. 11.
32
John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz et al., “The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study,”
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. Accessed November 12, 2015,
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-ch4-9.pdf, p. 29.
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Nuclear fuel begins as uranium ore processed into “yellowcake,” where the ore is
“acid-leached to extract uranium oxide.” 33 In order to power a light water reactor,
uranium requires a concentration of U235 that is generally between 4% and 5%.34 Due to
uranium’s naturally low concentration of U235,35 this yellowcake must be further
processed and enriched before it can become fuel.
Once yellowcake is delivered to a conversion plant, it undergoes a number of
chemical processes to convert it into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas. This chemical
compound contains two uranium isotopes: U235, which is lighter and fissile; and U238,
which is heavier and not fissile. At this stage, the UF6 is close to uranium’s natural
concentration of 99.3% U238 to 0.7% U235.36
Fission, the splitting of an atom, releases significant amounts of heat. 37 A higher
concentration of fissile material allows for more nuclear reactions and thus greater energy
density. For the average low-enriched uranium (LEU) reactor to produce power from the
fission process, the concentration of its fissile U235 must be significantly higher than the
naturally-occurring 0.7% – it is typically required to be around 5%.38
During the enrichment process, UF6 is subjected to one of three methods to
increase its U235 content. During gaseous diffusion, the UF6 is filtered through porous
barriers in gas form to capture U238 particles; when the appropriate U235 concentration is

33

“Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” p. 8.
World Nuclear Association, “Uranium Enrichment,” April 2015. Accessed June 1, 2015.
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uraniumenrichment/.
35
“Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” p. 8.
36
World Nuclear Association, “Uranium: How does it Work?” March 2014. Accessed June 1, 2015.
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Introduction/What-is-Uranium--How-Does-itWork-/.
37
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Fission (fissioning),” March 20, 2015. Accessed June 1, 2015.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fission-fissioning.html.
38
“Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” p. 11.
34
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reached, it is cooled for transport. In the gas centrifuge process, UF6 gas is subjected to a
strong centrifugal force to pull U235 particles toward the center of their housing cylinders;
this enriched UF6 is then separated from the waste U238 to repeat the process until the
appropriate concentration is reached. Finally, a laser may be employed to target non-U235
molecules to change their chemical makeup; this allows for them to be more easily
separated to increase the UF6 ’s U235 concentration. 39
Only when the UF6 has been enriched can it be turned into fuel. The UF6 arrives
at a fuel fabrication plant (or less commonly, a separate conversion plant),40 where it is
converted into uranium dioxide (UO2). UO2 emerges as a powder, which is subsequently
encased in ceramic to form a cylindrical pellet that is traditionally “just under one
centimetre [sic] in diameter and a little more than one centimetre long.”41
These pellets are manufactured to be as similar to one another as is possible; they
are then encased in tubes typically one-half inch in diameter and up to fifteen feet long to
create a fuel rod, per the specifications of the plant to which they will be delivered. Fuel
rods are subsequently attached to one another to form fuel arrays, which are similarly
assembled in aptly-named “fuel assemblies.” These fuel assemblies are specially
engineered products that are tailored to the needs of a specific power plant.42
Once in the nuclear power plant, and fission is underway, fuel assembly arrays
begin to lose the sufficient mass of U235 which allows a nuclear chain reaction to occur.
However, plutonium-239 (Pu239), a byproduct of the same nuclear reaction, can be
39
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blended with uranium at reprocessing plants to create “mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel” after
the operating life of a reactor assembly has expired. Globally, MOX contributes to
approximately 2% of new nuclear fuel production.43
As an expensive and infrastructure-intensive endeavor for any nation, a full
nuclear fuel cycle is not a particularly common occurrence in the international
community. Enrichment and reprocessing plants alone, which would allow for MOX
production, are economically questionable facilities given that “a single large enrichment
plant can supply up to 25% of the world market,” and that such large commercial
enrichment plants already exist in Canada, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.44

Research Reactors and Fuel Requirements
The use and benefits of nuclear material for peaceful purposes is guaranteed under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),45 which has nearuniversal membership.46 However, there is a line between the use of nuclear power for
peaceful means and for its use as a weapon. The National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) notes that both nuclear materials “and the facilities used to
produce them” can be made to support nuclear weapons programs.47
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When enriching uranium, the “standard measure of enrichment services” is the
Separative Work Unit (SWU).48 A SWU “measures the quantity of separative work49
performed to enrich a given amount of uranium.” 50 Separative Work Units correspond to
how much time uranium feed (generally expressed in tonnes or kilograms) spends in a
centrifuge.
This is an important definition, as it highlights the fact that the only difference
between uranium enriched for nuclear reactors and uranium enriched for nuclear weapons
is the concentration of U235, which in turn is influenced primarily by the amount of
separative work to which it has been subjected. Weapons-grade uranium, which is
uranium enriched to above 90%, requires no special facilities or processes beyond what is
required for the average nuclear reactor.51
It is this very principle which makes civilian research reactors a concern from a
nonproliferation standpoint. More than 700 research reactors have been constructed
globally, of which 247 continue to operate (with an additional 20 under construction or
planned as of 2014).52 Like any technology, a research reactor is a benign tool on its own.
In fact, research reactors contribute to “almost every field of science”.53
Research reactors are typically operated for the radiation they produce as opposed
to their energy output54 (the output of every active research reactor across the world,
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combined, is estimated at 3,000 MW – roughly equivalent to one civilian nuclear power
plant).55 This radiation can be used for a number of purposes which include: 56




Neutron scattering, to analyze materials on a molecular level;
Neutron radiography, which can determine “structural integrity and
provide quality control for aerospace, automotive, and medical
components”; and
Neutron activation analysis, which can detect trace materials such as
pollutants or can create radioactive material used in medicine.

These same types of reactors can also be used for education and training purposes.
In the United States, for example, research reactors exist predominantly57 on college
campuses, and “were initially constructed for nuclear engineering and radiological
science research and education.”58 There are many peaceful incentives for the pursuit of a
research reactor. However, these peaceful incentives can be used to mask a weapons
development program.
The nonproliferation concern of a research reactor comes from the U 235 content of
the fuel required to operate it. Research reactors commonly consume highly-enriched
uranium (HEU), which is uranium enriched to levels at or above 20%. A small minority
require weapons-grade uranium for the same, civilian purposes described above. 59
Therefore, countries pursuing or operating a research reactor have a reason for requiring
access to HEU. Notably, the technical requirements for enriching uranium mean that
enriching from HEU levels to weapons-grade uranium is a significantly less intensive
process than enriching LEU to HEU levels.
55
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Data from the World Nuclear Association describes the relative work required to
convert an input of uranium into an output of enriched uranium (Figure 1). The bulk of
the enriching process (approximately 800-900 SWU per tonne of uranium feed) occurs to
bring the U235 concentration up to LEU levels. To achieve highly-enriched uranium, the
same input requires only a total of approximately 1,100 SWU – an increase of less than
one-fourth of the effort required for standard fuel purposes. Once HEU levels are
achieved, less than 200 additional SWU are required for the same input to be rendered
weapons-grade uranium.

Figure 1. Separative Work Units required to turn 1 tonne of uranium into enriched
uranium. The final mass decreases as the uranium becomes more highly enriched. 60

Neither the United States nor the international community is blind to the
proliferation concerns of research reactor fuel requirements. While the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) states its policy as being “to promote, support and assist
60
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Member States in the development and maintenance” of research reactors “for the benefit
of the nuclear industry and the well-being of humanity,”61 it recognizes the need to
“minimize civilian use of highly enriched uranium.”62 Similarly, the United States
Department of Energy launched the “Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test
Reactors (RETR) Program” in 1978 specifically to assist in converting HEU research
reactors to LEU fuel requirements; under the RETR Program, 40 such reactors have been
successfully converted.63

Indigenous Enrichment Programs
Both research reactors and nuclear power have a legitimate need for enriched
uranium fuels. However, the volumes of fuel required – as previously stated – do not
necessarily make a fuel cycle logical from an economic standpoint. This is even more
true in the case of research reactors where, despite their HEU requirements, the volume
necessary to function is “far less”64 than that of a nuclear power plant. A closed fuel
cycle is little better, given the low prevalence of MOX fuel globally, and so a country’s
pursuit of these facilities can function as a red flag that they may be pursuing programs
that are not peaceful in nature.
While a red flag is not proof of malicious intent, one conclusion that can be drawn
from a nation that has minimal nuclear infrastructure yet is pursuing an indigenous closed
fuel cycle is that economics are not the primary motivation for the enrichment process.
61
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Brazil and Argentina, for example, each pursued small enrichment programs that were
designed to provide a stable supply of enriched uranium “at a cost that is likely
substantially higher than just procuring these services from large international
suppliers.”65 The development of indigenous enrichment capabilities in these countries
began in response to restrictions on nuclear technology transfers following India’s
decision to detonate an atomic device in 1974.66 This suggests that the security and
stability of supply was a significant factor for these countries, outweighing economic
factors which would discourage these programs.
In fact, security of supply is among the stated reasons for Iran’s enrichment
program. Ali Akbar Salehi, currently the chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization
(and the recipient of a PhD in nuclear engineering from MIT), has publicly identified
190,000 SWU of enrichment capacity as a core requirement to fuel Iran’s nuclear energy
and research program “after the end of the [fuel supply] contract with Russia”. 67 If this
assertion can be taken at face value, 68 then it would logically follow that the fear of losing
the supply of nuclear material by outside influences is of such a great concern to some
countries that no price is too high to pay to ensure that a reactor may be fueled, whether
that price is concretely measurable in hard currency or more abstractly in the form of
isolation from the international community.
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Possible Military Dimensions
On the other hand, Iran also shows that seventy years after the first and only
nuclear detonations as part of a military campaign, the international community remains
highly cautious about the circumstances under which a nuclear program is developed. It
simply cannot be repeated often enough that the technologies remain nearly identical for
both a peaceful nuclear enterprise and for a nuclear weapons program. This is why the
openness of the host country is of paramount importance as the international community
attempts to regulate the spread of such sensitive technologies and materials.
Unlike Iran, North Korea (DPRK) offers no ambiguity for what its nuclear
program was designed to achieve. The North Korean nuclear weapons program dates
back before 1985, when the United States announced that the DPRK was building a
secret nuclear reactor near the town of Yongbyon – 90km from the capital of Pyongyang.
North Korea was pressured into signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that
year, but initially “refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a party to the [NPT].” 69
An inspections agreement was finally signed between the IAEA and the DPRK in
1992. By 1993, the IAEA had discovered and subsequently requested access to two
unreported North Korean locations that were presumed to be storing nuclear waste. These
requests were denied. 70 North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT in
1993,71 but suspended its decision to withdraw during negotiations led by the United
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States to deescalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula and dismantle the North Korean
nuclear program. These efforts appeared to have been successful, with the DPRK
freezing and planning to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, and with pledges by the
United States and South Korea to assist in the construction of a light water reactor to
contribute to the North Korean civilian nuclear program.72
North Korea became a critical nonproliferation concern in 2002, as it was
between 1992 and 1994, when the CIA reported that the DPRK was procuring the
requisite infrastructure capable of producing multiple nuclear warheads on an annual
basis.73 The existence of a clandestine enrichment program was acknowledged by DPRK
officials that same year.74 North Korea has since withdrawn from the NPT as of 2003,75
and detonated nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, and 2013;76 the DPRK’s government has
threatened the United States with nuclear war on multiple occasions in the last year alone,
likely as a means to bolster its own deterrence posture.77,78,79
The case of North Korea is significant for a variety of reasons, but one which
shall receive special mention is the fact that its nuclear weapons program ostensibly
began as a peaceful enterprise. In 1950, the Yongbyon plant was designed with the aid of
72
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the Soviet Union as a research reactor. By 1967, the plant was operational. Although the
DPRK joined the NPT in 1985, safeguards inspections had failed to identify the DPRK’s
unreported storage sites prior to 1992. Whatever the original intent of the Yongbyon
plant, by the 1990s it was apparent that North Korea had been capable of stockpiling
enough weapons-grade plutonium for “one or two bombs.”80

Chapter Summary
Enriched uranium is one of the most versatile tools that mankind has harnessed to
date. The use and development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes is guaranteed
under the NPT, but whether or not enrichment is a similarly-guaranteed right is not
explicitly addressed by the treaty.81 A nuclear fuel cycle being uneconomical for the
average country, endeavors by a non nuclear weapons state to develop such a closed
system may suggest that ‘peaceful purposes’ are not the final goal.
What is truly concerning is how closely civilian and military nuclear technologies
mirror each other in the development phase. A nation enriching uranium above the 20%
threshold may be attempting to reduce the threshold to a nuclear weapons program, or it
may be attempting to fuel a research reactor which requires a denser concentration of
U235 to produce isotopes useful for civilian applications (such as for medical or structural
engineering purposes). A country could theoretically design a research reactor requiring
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weapons-grade uranium to operate and, so long as civilian applications are the only result
of the program, be well within its right under the NPT to require and demand a source of
fuel for its reactor.
This is what makes the study of possible military dimensions such an important
issue. Technologies, tools, and knowledge can be acquired by nearly any international
actor – it is simply not possible to un-invent the nuclear bomb – but how these actors
employ these assets is paramount to determining whether or not a malicious program will
develop.
Ultimately, unless the nature of the actor can be known and predicted, only the
control of uranium resources can prevent the occurrence of a new nuclear weapons state.
Most international nuclear suppliers have prerequisites and requirements to facilitate this
control, and international safeguards exist to ensure that uranium can be accounted for
and recovered after it has been supplied. As one such supplier, the United States pursues
its nonproliferation goals in part through restrictive nuclear cooperation agreements.
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NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

The current framework for U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements was set by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It is specifically Title I, Chapter 11, Section 123 (Section
123) of the Act which lays down the requirements for an agreement to be concluded with
a foreign power (and which provides the source of the term “123 Agreement”). Section
123 outlines nine specific pledges (Appendix) that a collaborating country must adhere to
in order to secure a 123 Agreement.
After signing a 123 Agreement, the President submits it to Congress for approval.
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
each receive a copy; by law, the proposed 123 Agreement must be held by these
committees for 90 days of continuous session. This allows for an appropriate amount of
time to be allotted for debating the merits and drawbacks of the proposed agreement;
should Congress find flaws in the agreement, it may submit a bill to disapprove the
agreement. Without passage of such a bill, however, the nuclear cooperation agreement
enters into force automatically at the end of the review period.
Since the 1954 Act was signed, the United States has embarked on a number of
these negotiations. In total, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) lists
twenty-four active partnerships as of July 2015 (that number rises to twenty-five with the
addition of Vietnam). 82 Among these are nuclear weapons states (such as China and
Russia), non-nuclear-weapons states (such Japan and Morocco), international bodies
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(such as the IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community83), and even countries
that formerly maintained or pursued nuclear weapons (such as Ukraine and South
Africa).
The conclusion of a 123 Agreement does not include the transfer of nuclear
materials, technologies, or data in and of itself. Rather, it serves as a framework which
authorizes American companies to conduct business with the cooperating Party. Such a
framework exists “to prevent diversion of U.S. commercial nuclear materials,
components and technology from their intended peaceful use.”84
Below are overviews of three 123 Agreements either negotiated or re-negotiated
by the United States after the “Gold Standard” was established in 2009; Vietnam and the
U.A.E. are discussed in more detail in the following chapter (see page 36). These
agreements provide necessary context for the diversity of American negotiating partners
in nuclear cooperation agreements.

Republic of China
Among the first 123 Agreements negotiated by the United States, the Republic of
China (Taiwan) signed a nuclear cooperation agreement one year after the passage of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.85 Prior to 1979, the United States recognized the
government in exile in Taiwan as the legal government of China. Following the U.S.-
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P.R.C. Joint Communique in 1979 with the People’s Republic of China (emphasis
added), the United States instead took the position that “there is but one China, and
Taiwan is part of China.” This declaration was made to recognize the Communist regime
in Beijing, where the Chinese Communist Party controls the vast majority of sovereign
Chinese territory. That being said, the United States was resolved to maintain “cultural,
commercial, and other unofficial relationships with the people on Taiwan.” Taiwan and
the United States have since enjoyed a “robust unofficial relationship.” 86
As an entity, Taiwan is perhaps most unique among American nuclear
cooperation agreements in that it is technically neither a country nor a collection of
countries; the United States considers the question of the sovereignty of the island of
Taiwan to be “unsettled.” According to the Congressional Research Service, “the United
States has supported a future determination of the island’s status in a peaceful manner”
dating back to a statement made by President Truman in June of 1950. 87 So long as
violence does not break out between Taipei and Beijing, the United States is content to let
the island’s integration with or independence from mainland China progress at its own
pace. In the meantime, cooperation and contact, of a non-official nature, primarily occurs
between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative Office.
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Taiwan’s 123 Agreement was renewed indefinitely in 2014,88 having been renegotiated in 2013. To date, the island has maintained a “reliable record on
nonproliferation.”89 This record, despite Taiwan’s lack of official status, would indicate
that a truly robust counter to proliferation concerns is adherence to broader international
frameworks (such as the NPT and IAEA safeguards). Taiwan, a close democratic partner
of the United States, did include a legally-binding ban on the procurement of enrichment
and reprocessing technologies in its 123 Agreement.90 However, as the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace notes, each of Taiwan’s nuclear reactors is “based on
U.S. intellectual property,” and Taiwan’s current fuel cycle currently processes uranium
through American vendors.91
In other words, due to Taiwan’s over-reliance on American supplies and
technology, the United States is free to mandate that Taiwan continue to not enrich
uranium. This is not a scalable model for the international community, as the
international community is far from reliant solely on American-sourced nuclear fuel.
Furthermore, this ban is consistent with existing Taiwanese legislation that would phase
out nuclear power on the island altogether. 92 Applying the “Gold Standard” to Taiwan is
somewhat of a hollow victory, therefore, as the nonproliferation goals which the United
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States sought through the “Gold Standard” had been achieved, arguably, decades before
this 123 Agreement was renewed.

People’s Republic of China
Negotiated some decades after the agreement with Taiwan, and several years after
the United States recognized the communist government of mainland China (the People’s
Republic of China, or PRC), the 123 Agreement concluded between China and the
United States was signed in 1985. Then, just as now, there were concerns regarding the
PRC’s proliferation behavior. The waivers required to permit the export of materials and
technologies to China were not issued until 1998, thirteen years later. 93
By the end of that same year, Congress had established the Cox Commission to
determine whether or not sensitive data had been obtained by China as a result of
American exports. The Commission released a declassified report in 1999 stating that
China had ““stolen” classified information on the most advanced U.S. thermonuclear
warheads,” in operations that dated back to the 1970s and had lasted at least through the
duration of the Cox Commission. This included information on the entirety of the
deployed American arsenal; re-entry vehicles; and even submarine-launched ballistic
missile technologies.94
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China itself has expressed interest in being a nuclear supplier. 95 As recently as
February of 2015, Beijing had announced that it had assisted Pakistan in developing six
nuclear reactors.96 Such cooperation has spanned the preceding decades into the early
1990s, and by the end of that decade China was suspected of having provided equipment
for a heavy water reactor that Pakistan used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. 97
As a nuclear weapons state, there are some allowances to be made for how China
uses material and non-material transfers under a 123 Agreement with the United States.
However such allowances, as outlined in the exemptions above, describe only the transfer
of sensitive technologies and technologies that China already possesses (or which would
not greatly advance Chinese nuclear weapons programs). In theory, a 123 Agreement
would limit China’s ability to reprocess and enrich fuel and uranium sourced from the
United States without expressed permission granted by the American government.
To avoid the hassle of coming to its American counterparts whenever it seeks to
enrich or reprocess American-sourced nuclear material, an “advance consent” clause had
been added to the U.S.-China 123 Agreement which Congress reviewed98 and ultimately
allowed to renew in 2015.99 This would effectively relieve China from even the most
basic restrictions of a nuclear cooperation agreement which adheres to the previously-
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established “Gold Standard” of nuclear nonproliferation by granting, as the name implies,
advanced consent by the American government for the enrichment and reprocessing of
American-sourced materials.
Notably, Euratom and India (the latter of which is one of China’s regional
strategic rivals) both obtained an “advance consent” clause in their respective 123
Agreements. China likely required the same from the U.S. in order to maintain strategic
competition with India in particular, and the Administration rationalized the decision to
include the clause by explaining that rejecting the deal would “leave the United States in
a weaker position to influence China’s nonproliferation behavior.” 100 The Congressional
Research Service notes that China would only be able to conduct reprocessing of
American material in “facilities that are under or are eligible for IAEA safeguards,” and
that the resulting material “may not be for military use.”101
While the relevance of the “Gold Standard” as it applies to China may seem
minimal, given China’s status as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, to the contrary
it further highlights the disparity between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear
weapons states as identified by the NPT. If advanced nuclear infrastructure can provide
more favorable negotiating terms with the United States, then it is likely that countries
will consider pursuing more advanced infrastructure before attempting to enter into a 123
Agreement with the United States. This could include the pursuit of enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities.
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Russian Federation
Like the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation is a nuclear weapons
state. The United States and Russia did not negotiate a 123 Agreement until 2008, nearly
two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union. This agreement was preceded by a Joint
Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin in 2007
announcing a “bilateral Agreement between the [United States and Russia] for
cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy.” 102 Both the U.S. and Russia
sought to expand access by developing nations to peaceful nuclear power, consistent both
with international law and the goal of nuclear nonproliferation.
Through this Joint Declaration, both parties would seek to “permit states to gain
the benefits of nuclear energy and to create a viable alternative to the acquisition of
sensitive fuel cycle technologies.” 103 Building on this key nonproliferation posture
statement, President Bush submitted the U.S.-Russian 123 Agreement in May of 2008.
However, the agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration in September
of that same year citing Russian military action in Georgia. 104
In May of 2010, two years after the Russian-U.S. 123 Agreement was negotiated
and less than a year after the “Gold Standard” agreement with the United Arab Emirates
was signed, the Russian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was once again submitted to
Congress. 105 Much of the debate over ratification of the agreement was less concerned
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with Russian military action, the aggression in Georgia having largely fallen out of the
public debate, and more concerned with Russian support of Iranian nuclear and ballistic
missile programs.106 This is consistent with the concerns of the 110th Congress in 2008,107
and in fact appears as key points in testimony both from government 108 and nongovernment109 congressional witnesses during that period.
Given Russia’s status as a nuclear energy supplier, it is generally accepted that
Russia will continue enriching and exporting uranium to countries that both have and
have not signed 123 Agreements with the United States, thus providing a limiting factor
for the influence which the United States has in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation.
However, Russian nonproliferation goals can be complimentary to those of the U.S.
In 2006, for example, Russia proposed the creation of a “system of international
centers providing nuclear fuel cycle services.”110 By May of 2007, two months prior to
the U.S.-Russia Joint Declaration above, Russia and Kazakhstan had agreed to establish
the International Uranium Enrichment Center.111 Its stated purpose, which the United
States supports, is to “ensure guaranteed supplies of uranium product to countries that
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have elected to join the Center as an alternative to development of their own
enrichment,”112 provided that member countries adhere to IAEA safeguards and accept
nuclear fuel supplies that are exported from the Russian Federation. 113 As of August
2015, the member states are Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Armenia. 114
The Uranium Enrichment Center coordinated by Russia highlights two very
important points: First, as with Taiwan and the United States, being the sole supplier of
nuclear fuel is a key means of dissuading states from pursuing enrichment technologies
of their own accord. Second, and very much related to the first point, the United States is
far from the only nuclear supplier in the global community.

Chapter Summary
The three selected nuclear cooperation agreements above highlight the diversity in
American nuclear negotiating partners. Taiwan, entirely reliant on the United States for
its nuclear program, shows that dominance of supply can be a crucial factor in mandating
limits on enrichment and reprocessing rights. Russia and China, an established and
emerging nuclear supplier, respectively, are both nuclear weapons states as defined by the
NPT. In both of these cases, existing enrichment and reprocessing infrastructure as well
as existing supply relationships between these powers and other countries make banning
this enrichment and reprocessing capacity untenable politically.
Each of these agreements was additionally re-negotiated following the
establishment of the “Gold Standard.” Although enrichment and reprocessing were
112
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successfully banned in the U.A.E., attempting to do the same with nuclear weapons
powers that were, and remain, highly unlikely to relinquish their own nuclear
infrastructures would likely have been a fruitless effort; this paper does not recommend
that the United States should have applied the “Gold Standard” to Russia and China.
However, offering more favorable negotiating terms to nations with advanced nuclear
infrastructures likely has the unintended consequence of causing less-developed nations
to pursue their own advanced nuclear infrastructures before turning to the United States
for assistance. This would allow them to receive the most favorable terms from a 123
Agreement with the United States.
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ESTABLISHING THE “GOLD” AND “SILVER” STANDARDS

The “Gold” and “Silver” Standards were set, in the realm of nuclear
nonproliferation, by the United Arab Emirates and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Under the “Gold Standard,” the United Arab Emirates agreed to be legally bound from
enriching or reprocessing uranium on its own territory through the 123 Agreement that it
signed with the United States of America. This was an unprecedented step in terms of
American civilian nuclear cooperation; the only other entity to agree to such a ban had
previously been Taiwan (see page 26).
When the United States began its 123 negotiations with Vietnam, there was hope,
particularly from members of Congress, 115 that the “Gold Standard” would become the
chief pursuit of American nuclear cooperation negotiations. Instead, Vietnam established
the “Silver Standard” with a political commitment against enrichment and reprocessing
that was not legally binding. Senator Bob Corker (R-TN), the Ranking Member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time, criticized the Obama administration for
its “inconsistent and confusing” standards for nuclear cooperation agreements, stating
that such a track record could potentially compromise “our nation’s nonproliferation
policies and goals.”116 Through reviewing the text of both 123 Agreements, trends
between the “Gold” and “Silver” standards can be examined for how well they may apply
to future negotiations.
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The U.S.-U.A.E. 123 Agreement
On May 21, 2009, President Barack Obama submitted the text of the proposed
nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates
to the 111th Congress for review, pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954. As a non-nuclear-weapons party to the NPT, the U.A.E. was already barred from
receiving any scientific or technical assistance leading to the development of a nuclear
weapon. Even so, the United States determined that “prior to U.S. licensing of exports of
nuclear material, equipment, components, or technology” or any other nuclear
cooperation pursuant to the 123 Agreement, the Additional Protocol would have to come
into force over the U.A.E.’s nuclear program. 118
The Additional Protocol “grants the IAEA complementary legal authority to
verify a State’s safeguards obligations.” It grants the IAEA information about (and access
to) the entirety of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle; more latitude, ease of entry into a country,
and access to communications, for IAEA inspectors; and additional access to information
and records which make identifying undeclared nuclear sites easier for the IAEA. While
the Additional Protocol is on the whole more invasive of the host country, the benefits to
global nonproliferation goals are great enough that 126 countries and Euratom have
brought the Additional Protocol into force, with an additional 20 countries having signed
it (with entry into force pending). 119
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Prior to the submission of the text of the 123 Agreement, however, the United
Arab Emirates had undergone its own internal review of the requirements for a domestic
nuclear program. The U.A.E. had found that, starting in 2007, annual demand for
electricity was predicted to increase by 9% through 2020. In a government white paper
released in 2008 identifying this and other relevant findings, the U.A.E. noted that nonnuclear, renewable energy sources such as solar would realistically (given the technology
available at the time) cover approximately 7% of peak daily demand by the 2020
timeframe. It was therefore decided that nuclear energy would be the most appropriate
source of electricity for the growing country “as a proven, environmentally promising
and commercially competitive option”. 120
One very significant portion of the white paper was highlighted in a press release
by the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington, D.C. upon the white paper’s
release. “Embodied in the UAE policy on peaceful nuclear energy are a pledge to forego
any domestic enrichment or reprocessing capability in favor of long-term external fuel
supply arrangements,” it states, along with “a pledge to conclude a number of pertinent
international agreements, including the IAEA Additional Protocol”. 121 The United States
and the United Arab Emirates released a “Memorandum of Understanding” one day after
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the white paper was released, stating the U.S. intent to assist the U.A.E. with its nuclear
program. 122
This would seem to imply that talks for nuclear cooperation between the two
powers predated the completion of the white paper. It is difficult to determine whether
the philosophy to forego domestic enrichment capabilities came from within the U.A.E.
or was imposed upon it by its partners throughout the negotiating process, but in the years
following the 123 Agreement the UAE has been a vocal advocate of the “Gold Standard.”
Hamad Al Kaabi, the UAE representative to the IAEA in 2012, publicly stated that it
“does not make sense” for nations developing new civilian nuclear power initiatives to
pursue enrichment capabilities just months after the Obama administration decided to
pursue a case-by-case negotiating strategy for enrichment and reprocessing bans. 123
Within the 123 Agreement itself, the pledge not to enrich is enshrined in Article 7,
which states that
The United Arab Emirates shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its
territory or otherwise engage in activities within its territory for, or relating to, the
enrichment or reprocessing of material, or for the alteration in form or content
(except by irradiation or further irradiation or, if agreed by the Parties, postirradiation examination) of plutonium, uranium 233, high enriched uranium, or
irradiated source or special fissionable material. 124
The Agreement also specifies in Article 6 that material transferred under the agreement
may not be enriched or reprocessed without prior approval from the United States,
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although “irradiation” and “further irradiation” are exempt (as in Article 7). 125 An
exemption of irradiation is likely to allow for the naturally-occurring irradiation of
plutonium byproduct during the operation of a civilian nuclear power plant. 126
Under the Agreed Minute,127 the restriction on modifying special or fissionable
material is further defined to require that such activities take place on the territory of an
agreed third party. 128 This would provide a model for other countries to follow by
showing future partners that all rights guaranteed under the NPT (including those of
controversial nature such as the modification of special and fissionable materials) could
be exercised under a multilateral system, so long as unreasonable transfers and
proliferation concerns can be adequately guarded against. Such a model reinforces
existing multilateral regimes by its very nature, as these are the regimes upon which the
123 Agreement will have to rely to ensure that the U.A.E.’s nuclear fuel supply remains
uninterrupted, and would increase the U.S. stature as a nuclear facilitator.
For all of the benefits of the 123 Agreement with the United Arab Emirates,
however, two key drawbacks become apparent. Article 13 of the 123 Agreement governs
the penalties for violating “the provisions of Article 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10;” the violation of
IAEA safeguards; and the detonation of a nuclear device by the United Arab Emirates.
Due to the bilateral nature of 123 Agreements, the United States is limited under the
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agreement to “requiring the return of any material, equipment or components transferred
under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use”. 129
Although options outside of Article 13 exist for taking punitive measures against
a theoretical violation of the 123 Agreement, such as diplomatic condemnation,
sanctions, or even military intervention, any response that is not detailed within the
agreement itself will require support from domestic partners (such as Congress and the
American people) or that from international partners (such as the European Union for
comprehensive sanctions regimes to be effective). The Article 13 measures can only
govern material sourced from American suppliers, and will not require other nations to
suspend nuclear material transfers should a violation occur. To the contrary, the U.A.E.
would remain freely able to obtain special and fissionable material from nuclear suppliers
with less stringent safeguards than the United States requires.
Second, the terms of the 123 Agreement, although signed and implemented as a
binding legal agreement, are not final. The Agreed Minute contains a section entitled
“Equal Terms and Condition for Cooperation” which affirms that the terms of the
agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates “shall be no less
favorable in scope and effect than those which may be accorded…to any other nonnuclear weapon State in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.” 130
It is logical to conclude that this section of the Agreed Minute played a key role in
facilitating the enrichment ban undertaken by the U.A.E. Should the United States sign a
nuclear cooperation agreement with another non-nuclear-weapons Middle Eastern state
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that is more favorable (which would likely include the definition by the U.A.E. as not
requiring such a state to forego enrichment and reprocessing capabilities), then the
U.A.E. could request that the 123 Agreement signed with the United States be revisited to
renegotiate the terms of the nuclear cooperation agreement, and thus restore its
competitive status with the remainder of the region.131
Even so, the 123 Agreement signed with the United Arab Emirates stands as one
of the strictest nuclear cooperation treaties that the United States has negotiated. Drafted
under the George W. Bush Administration, it was signed under President Barack Obama
and hailed by the State Department and the President as the “Gold Standard” for nuclear
nonproliferation. Members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, particularly the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, were optimistic that this “Gold
Standard” would become the norm for future nuclear cooperation negotiations. 132 By the
time of the 123 Agreement with Vietnam, however, the “Gold Standard” model of
nuclear nonproliferation would prove to be an elusive goal that has yet to be replicated.

The U.S.-Vietnam 123 Agreement
On May 8, 2014, five years after the “Gold Standard” nuclear cooperation
agreement with the United Arab Emirates, President Obama submitted to Congress the
text of a proposed 123 Agreement with Vietnam. 133 Talks surrounding the American-
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Vietnamese nuclear cooperation, however, predate a 2010 Memorandum of
Understanding signed between the two governments reaffirming “a common commitment
to the responsible expansion of civil nuclear power”. 134 Diplomacy tends to build off of
previous successes, and so this MOU being signed mere months after the U.S.-U.A.E.
123 had entered into force indicates that the United States should have attempted to
pursue a “Gold Standard” agreement with Vietnam as well.
It did not, however, and this seems to have been the result of disagreement
between the Departments of State and Energy. While the State Department under Deputy
Secretary James Steinberg called “Gold Standard” agreements a “broad policy objective”
in 2010, 135 Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman of the Department of Energy stated that
same year that requiring “any kind of pledges about what [Vietnam] should or should not
be doing to their own fuel cycle” would be “inappropriate,” particularly at that stage in
negotiations. 136 The disagreement between the two was great enough that the Vietnam
negotiations were placed on hold while the National Security Council conducted an
interagency review on the subject of universal application of the “Gold Standard.”137
Vietnam, according to the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement submitted
with the text of its 123 Agreement, has maintained an excellent nonproliferation record. It
signed the NPT in 1982; entered a Safeguards Agreement into force in 1990; entered the
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Additional Protocol into force as of 2012, and is party to the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (signed 1996, ratified 2006).138 In other words, since the installation of
the Dalat research reactor by the Soviet Union in 1963, Vietnam has been a responsible
partner in the realm of civilian nuclear energy. This includes the decision by the
Vietnamese government to modify its research reactor to operate on low-enriched
uranium, where previously it required high-enriched uranium;139 the upgrade was
completed in 2007140 and the last shipment of Vietnamese HEU was returned to Russia in
2013.141
Such nonproliferation cooperation has not ended at Vietnam’s borders, either. In
its tenure on the United Nations Security Council (2008-2009), Vietnam supported
sanctions against both Iran and North Korea for their nuclear programs. It also voted to
extend the mandate of UNSCR 1540, which “obliges States, inter alia, to refrain from
supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing,
possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
and their delivery systems.” It also imposes binding obligations “on all States” to prevent
the proliferation of WMDs and WMD delivery systems. 142 Vietnam subsequently “hosted
a workshop implementing UNSCR 1540 for countries in Southeast Asia.” 143 Despite such
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a strong nonproliferation record, however, Vietnam ultimately stopped short of binding
itself under the “Gold Standard.”
In the Preamble to the 123 Agreement between the United States and Vietnam,
“the intent of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to rely on existing international markets
for nuclear fuel services” is affirmed. This, as opposed to the acquisition of “sensitive
nuclear technologies,” would be Vietnam’s pledge to obtain enriched uranium for its
power plants.144 As a political statement, and not one enshrined within the articles of the
agreement, the decision by Vietnam to neither enrich nor reprocess uranium is not legally
binding. It has since been labeled the “Silver Standard” of nuclear nonproliferation. 145
A lack of a legally-binding mandate to forego enrichment and reprocessing is not
the only significant step back from the “Gold Standard.” Whereas the U.S.-U.A.E. 123
Agreement would be violated by the enrichment or reprocessing of any sensitive or fissile
material by the United Arab Emirates, under the U.S.-Vietnam 123 Agreement, only
material that is American in origin is restricted without prior American consent from
enrichment and reprocessing. Should Vietnam enrich or reprocess Russian-origin
material, for example, the United States has no legal grounds to withdraw from the
agreement and demand the return of what was supplied pursuant to the 123 Agreement.146
What is most striking, however, is the cause cited for withdrawing from the “Gold
Standard” by President Obama’s Administration. In 2012, the State Department sent a
letter to Congress detailing a case-by-case policy for enrichment and reprocessing
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restrictions. The State Department argued that overly restrictive 123 Agreements could
drive potential cooperative partners to foreign suppliers such as France and Russia. It
further asserted that consent rights offered through nuclear trade agreements can play a
critical role in ensuring that nonproliferation regimes are upheld, that U.S. influence
would be minimized without a wide array of civilian nuclear partner states, and that
pursuing options other than a case-by-case basis would “[raise] questions about [U.S.]
reliability as a supplier.”147

Chapter Summary
Civilian nuclear energy, and indeed any form of cooperative nuclear endeavor, is
a particularly sensitive subject due to the dual-use nature of the materials and
technologies involved. Protecting a country’s right to exercise the authorities granted to it
under the NPT can come at odds with the need of the United States and the international
community to counter avenues for nuclear proliferation. An interpretation, for example,
that the NPT confers the right to enrich uranium would allow for a signatory country to
build enrichment and reprocessing facilities; this would then create another source by
which enrichment and reprocessing technologies could spread to rogue actors.
In comparing the agreements that the United States signed with Vietnam and the
U.A.E., the difficulty of pursuing the “Gold Standard” on a global scale becomes
apparent. Countries are likely to pursue their own interests which, as in the case of the
U.A.E., can coincide with the broader needs of the international community. However,
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Vietnam’s 123 Agreement and the Agreed Minute addendum to the U.A.E.’s 123
Agreement show that countries are wary of how the global security situation will evolve.
Vietnam likely does not envision a scenario in which it would have to enrich or
reprocess nuclear fuel on its own territory in the future, or it would not have pledged to
forgo this capacity, but the government of Vietnam cannot predict the future. Without a
legally-binding clause which mandates forgoing enrichment and reprocessing facilities, it
is in a position to pursue these facilities in the future if the needs of the state require
doing so. The U.A.E. similarly ensured that it would be able to re-negotiate its access to
enrichment and reprocessing facilities should such a capacity be granted to its regional
counterparts.

47

CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

One key method of tracking the climate of political issues, whether foreign or
domestic, is to review legislation put forward by the United States Congress on the
subject. The United States has traditionally supported strong safeguards and verification
regimes with regard to foreign powers,148 and so it is no surprise that Congress would
seek to further enhance existing restrictions on foreign nuclear partners in the interests of
the American people. Such are the bills that will be explored below.
Although it is the role of the Executive Branch to negotiate with foreign powers,
it does so within the boundaries of law laid out by the Legislative Branch. The role of
Congress is to advise on and consent to bilateral agreements as negotiated by the
President. Congress can also establish laws, such as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to
which the Executive Branch must adhere; such laws may be subsequently modified by
Congress in order to ensure that the best interests of the nation are being represented.
A number of bills have been selected dating back to the first session of the 110 th
Congress (2007). These bills were chosen based on their intent to modify the nuclear
cooperation negotiating process, either by mandating bans on foreign uranium
enrichment, or by assuming heightened oversight of the global nuclear trade. In
examining these bills, a sense of the climate surrounding the U.S. role in cooperative
nuclear programs can be offered.
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The 110th Congress was chosen as it creates a baseline which predates the 2009
“Gold Standard.” This is particularly important, as the attempts by Congress to mandate
stricter terms for 123 Agreements have traditionally been unsuccessful. Despite what may
or may not be considered failures in legislation (which is a somewhat subjective
determination), this will allow for better insight as to how Congress’ vision for the
American nonproliferation regime has evolved after a cooperative foreign state agreed to
forego enrichment and reprocessing capacity.
Bills which have been detailed below do not include every attempt by Congress to
influence all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle as it relates to the United States. 149
However, it is a faithful look at the bills which would have influenced 123 Agreements
and nuclear fuel safeguards with foreign states between the 110th and 114th Congresses.

S. 1138 (110th Congress, First Session)
On April 18, 2007, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) introduced the “Nuclear
Safeguards and Supply Act of 2007” (S. 1138) to the Senate Floor. Referred to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, S. 1138 sought to “enhance nuclear safeguards and to
provide assurances of nuclear fuel supply to countries that forgo certain fuel cycle
activities.”150 Senator Lugar was joined by Senators Evan Bayh (D-IN) and Charles
Hagel (R-NE) as cosponsors.151
Title I of the Act makes several foundational observations regarding the nuclear
fuel cycles of foreign countries. Among these observations is the fact that Congress has
149
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“long supported” the assurance of supply of foreign civilian nuclear programs.
Furthermore, Congress has similarly supported “assistance to the developing world for
nuclear and non-nuclear energy sources.” 152 These are not particularly groundbreaking
observations, as these items are the basic tenets of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (to which the United States is a signatory).
Senator Lugar and his cosponsors also asserted the finding that a “reawakened
interest” in nuclear energy would lead additional foreign states to seek their own “fuel
cycle facilities and nuclear know-how.”153 They cite a United Nations report154 which
asserted that “creating incentives for countries to forgo the development of domestic
uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities is essential” to reducing the risk and
threat of a nuclear attack, in part by reducing avenues for nuclear proliferation to occur155
(thereby reducing the number of possible instances wherein a nuclear launch could take
place). Ultimately, Senators Lugar, Bayh, and Hagel would see existing IAEA safeguards
and the Additional Protocol (which represent “minimum standards”) expanded and
strengthened, with incentives offered to emerging nuclear powers to keep them from
producing enriched uranium domestically.
Consistent with these findings, Title I, Section 102 of the Act would have
declared the continuation of American policy to provide adequate supplies of nuclear fuel
to foreign states. Additionally, it would have declared the new policy of simultaneously
discouraging the development of enrichment and reprocessing technologies among
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emerging foreign powers, and of encouraging the creation of bi- and multi-lateral nuclear
fuel supply assurances.
Title II, Section 202 of the Act would have required the President to submit to
Congress a report “detailing the feasibility of establishing an International Nuclear Fuel
Authority (INFA) as called for in section 104 (a)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3223(a)(1)).”156 This largely would have been a feasibility report
providing Congress with the estimated cost, political, and legal barriers to establishing
such a body. Although this Act would neither establish an international governing body
nor prohibit foreign powers from enriching, it would have laid the groundwork for “Gold
Standard” style agreements to become the norm during American 123 Agreement
negotiations before the agreement with the U.A.E. had been negotiated.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted in its report that international
bodies, such as the one laid out in Title II, were generally received favorably by the
international community. 157 Furthermore, the Report states that the Act would be signing
into law a policy which President Bush had articulated several years previously – namely,
that “the world’s leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access
at a reasonable cost” to nuclear fuel supplies. 158 The last action taken on S. 1138 was that
it was placed on the Legislative Calendar, indicating that it never received a Floor Vote.
As such, S. 1138 never became law.
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H.R. 885 (110th Congress, First Session)
The first version of the “International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and
Nonproliferation Act of 2007 (H.R. 885) was submitted to the House Floor by
Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) on February 7, 2007. Referred to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.R. 885 was drafted in order to “support the
establishment of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for
peaceful means and to authorize voluntary contributions to the International Atomic
Energy Agency to support the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.” Mr.
Lantos was originally joined by Representatives Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and Brad
Sherman (D-CA) as cosponsors.159
Title I of the H.R. 885 found that, since 1946, “the number of countries that
possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such weapons makes the world less
secure and stable” due to the increased chance of use posed by such proliferation. The
Act also asserted that it is in the interest of the global community for the number of
enriching states to be held to a minimum; financing and constructing enrichment and
reprocessing facilities in new states was “indefensible on economic grounds alone.” The
Congressmen asserted, according to Title I, Section 101 of the Act, that multilateral
nuclear fuel suppliers could “reassure countries that are dependent upon or will construct
nuclear power reactors that they will have an assured supply of nuclear fuel at current

159

International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007, H.R. 885, 110th Congress (1st
Session), 2007. Accessed August 10, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/housebill/885/text.

52

market prices,” so long as said countries agree to not pursue domestic enrichment
capabilities.160
To further the findings of Section 101 (reinforced in the “Sense of the Congress”
Section 102), Title II would have authorized voluntary contributions to the IAEA “for the
purpose of supporting the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank to maintain
a reserve of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible countries in the
case of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by normal market mechanisms.”161
Under the oversight of the IAEA, the designated country (which would be a non-nuclearweapons state under the NPT) would be unable to have its own enrichment and
reprocessing programs.162
H.R. 885 passed the House by a two-thirds majority on June 18, 2007.165
However, certain changes were made to the text to reflect amendments by other members
of the House of Representatives. Primarily, these were clerical changes (for example,
identifying of the NPT in more specific terms in Title I, Section 101; and removing
explicit mentions of specific nuclear powers throughout Title I).166 The only major
substantive change involved nuance over how this center would be funding. 167
For the Act’s referral to the Senate, Congressmen Lantos, Ackerman, and
Sherman were joined by ten additional cosponsors, including Representative Ileana RosLehtinen (R-FL), who has been particularly active in attempting to pass legislation
160
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designed to restrict the enrichment capacity of foreign states.168 Having been referred to
the Senate, it was read twice before being sent to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. While H.R. 885 never itself became public law, portions of the bill related to
the establishment of an international fuel bank were enacted under the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161).169

H.R. 7068 (110th Congress, Second Session)
One year after S. 1138 left committee, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)
submitted the “Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2008”
(H.R. 7068). Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.R. 7068 sought to
“bolster regional capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats,”
“prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons” in the Western
Hemisphere, and “secure universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear
nonproliferation” (along with “other purposes”). Representative Ros-Lehtinen was joined
by Representatives Dan Burton (R-IN), Connie Mack (R-FL), and Steve Chabot (R-OH)
as cosponsors.170
Nuclear nonproliferation first appears as a significant topic in Title II of the Act.
Title II predominantly found against the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela,
and Iran, expressing that these governments may be proliferation concerns in the areas of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials and technologies. To advance the
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nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Title II would have required the United
States to implement a much stricter policy toward requiring additional IAEA safeguards.
This would include opposing the negotiation by any state of a “Small Quantities
Protocol” (SQP) with the IAEA, which “sets aside many of the operative provisions of a
general safeguards agreement” and renders the verification process of nuclear materials
and facilities (that they are not being used or diverted for illicit purposes) “significantly
impaired.”171
However, the Act does not end its mandate to the Executive Branch at a stricter
policy stance. H.R. 7068 would also require the President of the United States
[To] use all available political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure that each
country in the Western Hemisphere—
(1) has signed and implemented a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with the IAEA;
(2) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to its safeguards
agreement;
(3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA personnel to all nuclearrelated facilities;
(4) has implemented the provisions of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540;
(5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully implemented the conventions
referred to in section 202(a)(4);
(6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP if that country did not have
an SQP as of January 1, 2008; and
(7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an SQP agreement if a
country has such an agreement.172
The Act would also authorize sanctions that could be imposed against any
Western Hemisphere country which did not abide in full with the above requirements.
Specifically, nonhumanitarian foreign assistance could be ceased with the offending
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country. Additionally, “the sale, provision, or transfer of articles, including the issuance
of any specific license or grant of any other specific permission or authority to export any
goods or technology under” the Export Administration Act of 1979; the Arms Export
Control Act; the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or “any other statute that requires the prior
review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services” could be terminated.
Inherent in the Act, and explicitly stated in Section 205, is opposition to the
“development or acquisition by any country” of nuclear fuel fabrication capacity by any
state that did not possess it prior to January 1, 2008. The Act goes so far as to state that
“all available political, economic, and diplomatic tools” should be used by the President
of the United States to ensure that such development and acquisition is prevented. 173 Title
II culminated in the declaration that any country assisting either Venezuela or Cuba in
developing their respective domestic nuclear programs would be barred from negotiating
and licensing exports pursuant to a 123 Agreement with the United States.174
H.R. 7068 was introduced to the House Floor and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs. The Act did not leave the Committee, and thus does not have a voting
record associated with it. As such, the Act never became public law.

H.R. 1280 (112th Congress, First and Second Sessions)
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) made another attempt to influence
nuclear exports with the 112th Congress on March 31, 2011. A bill introduced “To amend
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the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require congressional approval of agreements for
peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, and for other purposes,” H.R. 1280
was referred initially to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Rules.
Representative Ros-Lehtinen was initially joined by Representatives Howard Berman (DCA), Edward Royce (R-CA), Brad Sherman (D-CA), Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE), and
Edward Markey (D-MA) as cosponsors of the bill. 175
As introduced on the House Floor, Section 1 of H.R. 1280 sought immediately to
set a higher bar for concluding 123 Agreements between the United States and partner
countries. H.R. 1280 would have required 123 Agreement partners to treat all nuclear
technology, materials, and facilities as American in origin for the purposes of export,
enrichment, and reprocessing. This in turn would mandate prior U.S. consent for these
activities. Section 1 would also have amended the Atomic Energy Act to include two key
restrictions on partner states, namely:
(10) a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nationals of a third country shall
be permitted access to any reactor, related equipment, or sensitive materials
transferred under the agreement for cooperation without the prior consent of the
United States; and
(11) if the cooperating party does not operate, as of April 1, 2011, enrichment or
reprocessing facilities, a requirement as part of the agreement for cooperation or
other legally binding document that is considered part of the agreement that no
enrichment or reprocessing activities, or acquisition or construction of facilities
for such activities, will occur within the territory over which the cooperating party
exercises sovereignty.176
Such an amendment as item (11) above would have been a significant victory for
the American nonproliferation regime, as it would have required the partner state to
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affirm the American interpretation of the NPT that there is no inherent right to enrich
under the Treaty. Item (10), as it is written above, could be interpreted as requiring prior
American consent even for routine IAEA inspections of American-origin facilities were
the inspectors themselves not American citizens. Taken together, these two amendments
to the Atomic Energy Act alone would have firmly declared American sovereignty over
the global nuclear enterprise, whether or not the United States was prepared to enforce
such a role, by stating that U.S. law trumps international law among 123 Agreement
parties.
Section 1 of the Act as introduced to the Floor would have gone further to restrict
not just the nuclear programs of partner states, but WMD programs as a whole for those
nations seeking nuclear cooperation with the United States. It set out as a requirement for
negotiations that the partner nation had to be a signatory to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and “all other international agreements
to which the United States is a party regarding the export of nuclear, chemical, biological,
and advanced conventional weapons, including missiles and other delivery systems.” The
same amendment to the Atomic Energy Act would also have required that the partner
country be “closely cooperating with the United States to prevent state sponsors of
terrorism” from “acquiring or developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or
related technologies”, or from “acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers and types
of advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles”. 177
Section 2 of the Act would have mandated “the policy of the United States to
oppose the withdrawal of any country that is a party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Non-humanitarian assistance could not have been
177
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provided to any country which withdrew from the NPT. All "material, equipment, or
components transferred under an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation that is in force
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954” would have needed to have
been returned to the United States under such circumstances, as well as “any special
fissionable material produced through the use of such material, equipment, or
components previously provided to a country that withdraws from the [NPT].”178
Under Section 3, the President would have been mandated by law to compare the
nonproliferation conditions of foreign countries with which the United States would
engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with that of the United States. A report would have
to be submitted to Congress for each 123 Agreement negotiation, detailing “the extent to
which the exports of each such country incorporate United States-origin components,
technology, or materials that require United States approval for re-export;” whether and
to what extent the partner country is investing in American civilian nuclear energy; and
“any United States grant, concessionary loan or loan guarantee, or any other incentive or
inducement to any such country or entity related to nuclear exports or investments in the
United States.”179
Finally, H.R. 1280 as introduced in the House would have required monthly
updates by the President to Congress on the status and content of new or renegotiated 123
Agreements. Congress would also have to vote in the affirmative for a 123 Agreement to
enter into force. This would have been a substantial change to the current law, which
enters a 123 Agreement into force so long as Congress does not explicitly vote against
the Agreement. Having been amended in May of 2012, H.R. 1280 sat in Committee for
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consideration for several months. On October 1, 2012, it was discharged from the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce to be considered by the whole House of
Representatives.
Several key changes exist between the H.R. 1280 as introduced and as reported.
First, H.R. 1280 as reported would have struck the requirement in Section 1 that the
partner country give up its right to enrich uranium. In its place, a “legal regime providing
for adequate protection from civil liability that will allow for the participation of United
States suppliers in any effort by the country to develop civilian nuclear power” was called
for. It would also have eliminated the President’s authority to exempt a proposed
Agreement that does not meet this requirement. 180
This change provides insight to the political climate surrounding nuclear
cooperation agreements. While the original bill would have imposed key nonproliferation
restrictions against the cooperating party, amendments to the text favored language on
providing economic incentives for American businesses. This is likely due to the Obama
administration’s coming out against H.R. 1280, citing “the bill’s potentially devastating
effects on U.S. exports, jobs, and the economy.” The Administration similarly asserted
that the bill would “severely limit the U.S. ability to strengthen nonproliferation
conditions with other countries.” It is reasonable to conclude that amendments to the bill
were designed to alleviate the concerns of the Obama administration. 181
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Second, H.R. 1280 as reported added an eighth section entitled “Prohibition on
Assistance to State Sponsors of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”182
Section 8 of the bill would have targeted countries which abused technologies and
weapons systems, and which were active in the transfer of these items. Rather than
preventing the spread of nuclear technologies by limiting access to them in the first place,
these would have been punitive measures designed to deter proliferation offenses from
occurring.
Finally, H.R. 1280 as reported added Sections 9 and 10 to the bill as introduced.
Section 9 would have made it “the policy of the United States to ensure that each country
that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should bring
into force an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.” Whether or
not a country had an Additional Protocol in force would also be taken into consideration
when negotiating a 123 Agreement.183 Section 10 was a “Sense of the Congress” clause
which, while not legally binding, would have expressed the opinion of the House and
Senate that the U.S. would not seek to impose new restrictions on promising cooperative
countries. Rather, Congress would direct the Executive Branch to selectively pursue
nuclear cooperation agreements with countries that already were in line with existing
U.S. nonproliferation policies.
However, H.R. 1280 as reported was never presented to the Senate. Despite the
addition of Representatives Dan Burton (R-IN), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Steve Chabot (ROH), and John Conyers (D-MI) as cosponsors, signaling strong bipartisan support, H.R.
1280 was ultimately not voted on by the full House of Representatives. H.R. 1280 never
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became law, and the Administration’s efforts to block the bill from advancing likely
played a key role in this outcome.

S. Res. 269 (113th Congress, First Session)
On October 16, 2013, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) introduced a bill on the
Senate Floor to express “the sense of the Senate on United States policy regarding
possession of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities by the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
The resolution, S. Res. 269, was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Rubio was joined by Senator James Risch (R-ID) as cosponsor.
Introduced as the Iran nuclear negotiations were gaining momentum, S. Res. 269
was designed as a “Sense of the Senate” document to express dissatisfaction with the
Iranian nonproliferation record. Two key findings that Senator Rubio offered when
drafting this document were boasts by Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, that Iran
had previously been successful at “buying time” for its nuclear programs in the past; and
the statement of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei “that if Iran ‘intended to
possess nuclear weapons, no power could stop us.’”186
Furthermore, Senator Rubio cited Iran’s “decades-long track record of cheating
on and violating commitments” and its “nuclear and missile programs in violation of
multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions” when expressing his
dissatisfaction with the emerging nuclear negotiations. Most notably, however, the text as
introduced in the Senate stated that “19 other nations currently access peaceful nuclear
energy without any enrichment or reprocessing activities on their soil,” and asserted that
186
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“the Government of Iran could likewise achieve access to peaceful nuclear energy
without enrichment or reprocessing activities on its own soil.”187
With these, and other, findings in mind, Senator Rubio expressed for
consideration the “Sense of the Senate” that
(1) it shall be the policy of the United States that the Government of Iran will not
be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon and that all instruments of United States
power and influence remain on the table to prevent this outcome;
(2) the Government of Iran does not have an absolute or inherent right to
enrichment and reprocessing technologies under the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow
July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the
“Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”);
(3) relief of sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program imposed upon Iran by the
United States should only be provided once Iran has completely abandoned its
nuclear weapons program, including any enrichment or reprocessing capability,
and has provided complete transparency to the International Atomic Energy
Agency regarding its work on weaponization of a nuclear device; and
(4) until the Government of Iran has taken the actions set forth in paragraph (3),
Congress should move to pass a new round of additional sanctions without
delay. 188
Perhaps most relevant to the topic of the “Gold Standard” would have been Item
(2) above, which states in no uncertain terms that the NPT does not inherently confer the
“right to enrich” upon any signatory. While the interpretation of the remainder of the
“Sense of the Senate” clause can reasonably be said to speak to Iran specifically, the
invocation of the NPT would likely have served as a wider signal regarding American
foreign policy that the United States’ commitment to limiting enrichment globally had
not wavered. This would have been highlighted with financial incentives for Iran to agree
to the American position that enrichment was not its inherent right: the relief of sanctions
in exchange for dismantling its enrichment and reprocessing capacity.
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S. Res. 269 ultimately received moderately strong partisan support among
Republican Senators. By the end of the 113th Congress, Senator Rubio was joined by
Senators James Inhofe (R-OK), John Cornyn (R-TX), Mark Kirk (R-IL), Roy Blunt (RMO), David Vitter (R-LA), Pat Roberts (R-KS), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Michael Enzi (RWY), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and Ted Cruz (R-TX).189
However, the nuclear negotiations that were occurring with Iran at the time likely had a
negative impact on the bill’s passage; the negotiating power of the President would have
been impacted by the passage of this “Sense of Congress,” and so the Executive Branch
would have devoted considerable effort to defeating the bill.

S. J. Res. 36 (113th Congress, Second Session)
On May 22, 2014, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) submitted a resolution on the
Vietnamese 123 Agreement for consideration by the Senate. “Relating to the approval
and implementation of the proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation between the
United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” S. J. Res 36 was designed to set a
fixed, thirty-year window on America’s global civilian nuclear exports. 190
Section 1 of the resolution as introduced in the Senate would have given
Congress’ explicit approval for the 123 Agreement with Vietnam. 191 Under Section 2, the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 would be amended such that “no license to export pursuant
to an agreement that has entered into force pursuant to the requirements of such section
189
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123 may be issued after the date that is 30 years after the date of entry into force of such
agreement.”192 The resolution would also have eased the renewal process for 123
Agreements, by allowing Congress to “enact a joint resolution permitting the issuance of
such licenses for an additional period of not more than 30 years” without requiring the
submission of a new 123 Agreement by the President of the United States.193
S. J. Res 36 garnered the support of two cosponsors during its time being debated
in the Senate. Senators Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) signed on as
cosponsors in June of 2014. By August of the same year, the joint resolution had
successfully passed the Senate. It was referred in the House, and submitted to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
As referred, the resolution had been amended to strengthen congressional
oversight of the nuclear export process. In Section 2, the language of the text struck
references to export licenses in favor of mandating that “no funds may be used to
implement any aspect of an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation” after a duration of
thirty years had passed. Additionally, the President would have to certify “within the final
five years of the agreement” that the terms and conditions of the agreement had been
upheld by the partner state, and “that the agreement continues to be in the interest of the
United States.” Congress would then pass a resolution allowing the cooperation
agreement to continue for an additional thirty-year period.194
Under the resolution as introduced, Section 2 exempted “any agreement with a
country that is a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Australia,
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Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative Office in the United States (TECRO), or the International Atomic Energy
Agency” from the thirty-year limitation and renewal requirements.195 As referred in the
House, however, only TECRO and the IAEA would be exempt. 196 In both versions,
agreements entered into prior to August 1st, 2014, would be exempt from the
requirements of S. J. Res 36, allowing the previously-negotiated end terms to conclude
before said agreements would fall under the jurisdiction of the revised renewal
requirements.
Finally, Section 3 as introduced in the Senate was struck and incorporated into
Section 2 as referred in the House above. Section 4 as referred in the House added
reporting requirements for Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements (NPAS),
pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Although the NPAS is
required to be submitted, in classified and unclassified formats, to the President, Section
4 as referred would have required that the NPAS be submitted also to “the appropriate
congressional committees.” This submission would largely have included background
information on the nuclear posture of the potential partner state. 197
Some of the information requested is, in fact, rather basic in terms of the context
of agreement ratification. For example, the “assessment of the consistency of the text of
the proposed agreement for cooperation with all the requirements of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954” is in part the purpose of assembling the congressional committee in the first
place. 198 This would seem to indicate the need of the congressional body for a

195

Section 2, S. J. Res 36, as introduced, 113th Congress (2nd Session), 2014.
Section 2, S. J. Res 36, as referred.
197
S. J. Res. 36, as referred.
198
Ibid.
196

66

homogenous source of information detailing the nonproliferation concerns regarding the
potential partner country.
Other items as would have been required by the resolution would seem to serve
the American public in terms of ease of access to information. “A historical review and
assessment of past proliferation activity of the cooperating party” combined with “list of
all the treaties and agreements related to non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction to which the cooperating party is also a party” (and the domestic laws
governing WMD proliferation issues) would have been entered into the Congressional
Record,199 which is a public document to which the American people would have access.
Given Congress’ role in advising and consenting to treaties with foreign powers, and its
mandate to be the voice of the American people, this would have given the opportunity
for the American people themselves to be more informed about such agreements. This, of
course, would only have applied to the unclassified NPAS – the classified annex would,
as the name implies, have remained restricted to those with the appropriate clearance and
access.
Despite the support it garnered in the Senate, S. J. Res. 36 failed to receive
traction in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It was never voted on by the full
House floor, and thus did not advance for signature by the President. Although the Act
never became public law, and the proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act were
not codified, by law passage in the Senate was sufficient to enact the proposed nuclear
cooperation with Vietnam.
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Chapter Summary
Congress’ attempts to mandate stricter terms within 123 Agreements do not
appear to have primarily been motivated by the “Gold Standard” signed with the United
Arab Emirates. Rather, they appear to be motivated by a desire for heightened oversight
over the global nuclear fuel cycle. This would include stricter safeguards for 123
Agreement parties. In some cases, it would also have included enforcing safeguards
restrictions against countries that had not signed a 123 Agreement.
Senator Lugar’s bill in the 110th Congress is an example of one such bill. By
offering a program to secure global access to nuclear fuel supplies, S. 1138 would have
incentivized the removal of domestic enrichment programs globally by offering a neutral,
third party medium that would take custodianship of fuel for nuclear reactors. The
additional reporting requirements and use of American funds (invoking Congress’
“Power of the Purse”) would have ensured congressional oversight over this proposed
international body.
As the bills reviewed were written, they can be interpreted as representing a
viewpoint that without signing a 123 Agreement with the United States, a foreign power
seeking nuclear fuel and a civilian nuclear program will be greatly hindered in this
pursuit. If this is the case, then such attempts at drafting law will likely fail: the United
States is far from the only nuclear supplier, and making stricter the requirements for
conducting business with the United States will likely serve only to make the United
States a less lucrative supplier in the nuclear trade. This was the Obama administration’s
argument in the 2012, when the Departments of State and Energy informed Congress in
part that “France and Russia in particular are very aggressive in pursuing nuclear
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business worldwide, and offer favorable terms. Neither imposes [enrichment and
reprocessing] conditions in their agreements.”200
In balancing nonproliferation concerns with economic considerations from 20072015, Congress has highlighted a negotiating environment wherein the barrier to entry for
civilian nuclear cooperation with the U.S. has been relaxed to allow for a larger number
of potential cooperative partners. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy
in the Department of Defense, characterized this idea that “nuclear salesmanship should
supersede security” as highly misguided. 201 It has further been argued that countries
seeking the “U.S. stamp of approval” for their nuclear programs would have kept demand
for 123 Agreements high, thus negating the need to make these agreements attractive
from a largely economic standpoint.202
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CONCLUSION: IRAN, THE JCPOA, AND FUTURE NUCLEAR
NEGOTIATIONS

In July of 2015, Iran signed an international agreement to suspend portions of its
nuclear program. Although not a 123 Agreement, and although the U.S. will not be
authorizing the transfer of nuclear materials to Iran as a result of the agreement, it is
nonetheless an important event in American nuclear negotiations. The U.S. has long
attempted to halt the spread of military nuclear programs, and so any concessions made
to Iran, a rogue actor in the international community, are likely to be sought by
cooperative partners abroad in future nuclear negotiations.

Development of the Iranian Nuclear Program
In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the United Nations General
Assembly to propose the establishment of an international atomic energy agency. Under
the direction of the U.N., this body (which ultimately became the IAEA) would “be made
responsible for the impounding, storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and
other materials.” Its “special purpose” would be to provide global access to nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes.203
On March 25, 1957, Iran and the United States signed an agreement regarding the
cooperative use of civilian nuclear power under the Atoms for Peace program. Entered

203

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of
America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,” United Nations General
Assembly, December 8, 1953. Accessed November 13, 2015 through the International Atomic Energy
Agency, https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech.

70

into force in 1959, the agreement made it possible for the United States to supply Iran
with a research reactor. Construction of this facility began in 1960. 204
The United States supplied weapons-grade uranium to fuel the reactor beginning
in 1967, 205 but banned transfers of highly enriched fuels to the country following the
1979 Islamic Revolution; Iran maintains a stockpile of U.S.-origin nuclear material that
was never returned.206 In the years between the establishment of peaceful cooperation and
the revolution, however, Iran went to great effort to show the international community
that it was pursuing a peaceful program.
In 1968, the NPT was first made available for countries to sign. Iran did so that
same year, and ratified the treaty in 1970.207 Four years later, Iran led an effort to
establish a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone.208 Even after the revolution, Iran
made attempts to show its willingness to abide by international norms; in 1987, Iran
struck a bilateral agreement with Argentina to convert the Tehran Research Reactor to
use fuel enriched to just under 20% instead of weapons-grade uranium. Tehran Research
Reactor has been operating with this LEU since 1993.209
Despite these noteworthy efforts, however, the international community has found
multiple reasons to be concerned with the Iranian nuclear program. The U.S. Intelligence
Community expressed in 1974 that Iran likely harbored nuclear weapons ambitions,
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noting that “Iran’s course will be strongly influenced by Indian nuclear programs.”210 The
pre-revolutionary government of Iran worked to develop a full nuclear fuel cycle, to
include enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. 211 Concerns about the Iranian nuclear
program grew to the point that the western states (including the U.S.) “in the shadow of
India’s successful nuclear test in May 1974,” withdrew support for it.212
These concerns grew, for the U.S. in particular, following the Iranian Revolution
and the ascension of a government that was vehemently anti-American in nature.
Although Iran suspended its nuclear program in 1979,213 the Arms Control Association
notes that Iran “views the United States as the central threat to its continued existence and
as the greatest obstacle to its regional ambitions,” and that “Tehran’s efforts to develop a
possible nuclear weapons capability should therefore be viewed through the prism of its
rivalry with the United States.”214
Iran’s nuclear program suspension lasted for approximately three years; the
Central Intelligence Agency reported that Iran restarted its program in 1982. In its report,
the CIA stated that “Iran does not pose a weapons proliferation threat at this time,” but
that uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs started prior to the Islamic

210

Director of Central Intelligence, “Special National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Further
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, August 23, 1974. Accessed
November 13, 2015, through George Washington University’s National Security Archive,
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf, p. 38.
211
Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Greg Thielmann, “Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle: The
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” 4th Edition, Section 1, Arms Control Association, June 22, 2014.
Accessed November 13, 2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/reports/Solving-the-Iranian-NuclearPuzzel/2014/06/Section_one.
212
Greg Bruno, “Backgrounder: Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2010.
Accessed November 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program/p16811.
213
“Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status,” p. 1.
214
“Iran and a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Middle East.”

72

Revolution “could provide a foundation for future weapons development.”215 If Iran is
driven by a desire to achieve a sense of strategic balance with the U.S., and if it is
developing weapons, then the U.S. and its allies would likely be the target of an Iranian
nuclear weapons program.
In 1987, Iran received schematics for constructing uranium enrichment
centrifuges through the A. Q. Khan network. Five years later, the U.S. Congress passed
“the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, which prohibits the transfer of
controlled goods or technology that might contribute “knowingly and materially” to
Iran’s proliferation of advanced conventional weapons.” It passed the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act in 1996, penalizing American and foreign entities which invested $20
million or more in the Iranian energy sector within the space of one year. 216
Despite these sanctions, the Iranian nuclear program progressed undeterred.
Reports surfaced by 2002 that Iran was hiding secret nuclear facilities in Natanz (uranium
enrichment) and Arak (plutonium production). The IAEA became involved soon after.
While Iran was initially cooperative in the IAEA’s inspections, the IAEA found Iran to
be noncompliant with its NPT safeguards agreement. Key to this noncompliance was
Iran’s “hiding [of] a wide range of strategic nuclear work.”217
In July of 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) announced its
concerns that, despite three years of inspections, the IAEA was “unable to provide
assurances about Iran’s undeclared nuclear material and activities.” The UNSC adopted
215
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resolution 1696, requiring Iran to “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities,” and allowed one month for compliance before Iran would “face the possibility
of economic and diplomatic sanctions.” Iran, in response, reiterated its position that its
program was peaceful in nature, and further stated that no ties between its facilities and a
nuclear weapons program had been described by the IAEA. 218
By 2008, the UNSC had imposed strong sanctions against Iran and had authorized
countries to board and inspect Iranian-flagged vessels in order to prevent shipments of
nuclear materials and technologies to the state from occurring. Iran admitted in
September of 2009 to constructing and maintaining a secret nuclear facility at Fordow.
Unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran grew increasingly severe
through 2013, as Iran consistently defied the UNSC219 and as President Obama regularly
reiterated that the United States was “committed to preventing Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons.”220

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
On November 24, 2013, the five permanent members of the UNSC and Germany
(P5+1) signed an agreement with Iran called the “Joint Plan of Action” (JPOA). The
JPOA was designed to, over the course of six months, move to freeze the Iranian nuclear
program until a comprehensive deal could be reached with Iran that would preclude the
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country from developing nuclear weapons. Extended for an additional six months in July
of 2014, and again in November of the same year until June of 2015, the JPOA in part
halted the enrichment of Iranian UF6 above 20%; required the facilitation of daily access
for IAEA inspectors to Natanz and Fordow; and required Iran to refrain from
constructing new enrichment sites. In return, the P5+1 repatriated $4.2 billion (USD) to
Iran, and agreed to not impose new nuclear sanctions against the state (whether from the
U.S., the U.N., or the E.U.).221
The culmination of the JPOA was the similarly-titled “Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action” (JCPOA), which was signed between the P5+1 and Iran on July 14, 2015.
Designed to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program evolves for peaceful purposes, the
JCPOA promises “comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as
multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme” in return for
“comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.” 222
However, the JCPOA was met immediately with criticism that it allowed Iran too
much freedom to operate its nuclear industry. The JCPOA was allowed to pass through
Congress largely on party lines (with Democrats supporting the President and
Republicans against), but even Democratic supporters were hesitant to endorse it: House
Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer (D-MD) went on record to say that the agreement was
“not one which I would have negotiated, nor one I think should have been agreed to,”
stating that it “gives too much to Iran and demands too little in return.”223 Part of this
221
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concern comes from the very idea of relieving nuclear-related sanctions; in a letter signed
by 344 members of the House of Representatives, it was noted that “[a]lmost all
sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program are also related to Tehran’s advancing
ballistic missile program, intensifying support for international terrorism, and other
unconventional weapons programs.” 224 The United States would de facto allow funding
for these activities by suspending or removing sanctions related to the nuclear program,
given the significant overlap between them.
Perhaps most relevant to the issue of the “Gold Standard” comes from the
Administration’s stance regarding the JCPOA. As the chief negotiating party on behalf of
the U.S., the Obama administration was very pleased with the outcome of the Iran deal,
noting that the JCPOA “blocks the four pathways to a nuclear weapon.” The tradeoff is
that the JCPOA provides by default consent for Iran’s enrichment program, and allows
Iran to keep more than 6,000 centrifuges for enriched uranium production. 225
This is in stark contrast to, and entirely incompatible with, the “Gold Standard”
statement of 2009, where the U.A.E. was praised for entirely forgoing enrichment and
reprocessing capacities. To subsequently hail the JCPOA as being “the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated”227 is to tacitly declare that enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities are not inherent proliferation risks.

224

U.S. House of Representatives, Letter to the President of the United States of America, July 9, 2014.
Accessed November 16, 2015, through the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/Iran%20sanctions%20letter.
pdf.
225
The White House, “The Historic Deal that will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon: How
the U.S. and the International Community will Block All of Iran’s Pathways to a Nuclear Weapon.”
Accessed November 16, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal.
227
Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The White House,
August 5, 2015. Accessed August 28, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.

76

Conclusion
In the nearly six years following the signing of the 123 Agreement between the
United States and the United Arab Emirates, the “Gold Standard” has not been
aggressively pursued. This is the opinion of Senator Corker, who describes an
“administration [that] appears to have walked away from this “Gold
Standard”…compromising our nation’s non-proliferation policies and goals.” 229 In
fairness to the administration, it is likely that if President Obama believed that the “Gold
Standard” was vital to U.S. nonproliferation goals, then the Departments of State and
Energy would not have clearly eschewed it in 2012 in favor of a case-by-case policy.230
Additionally, whether or not the United States can return to the “Gold Standard”
is a separate question from whether or not it should. The Department of State makes a
valid argument in identifying competition in the global nuclear trade as a reason to not
pursue strict adherence to the “Gold Standard.” Russian involvement in Vietnam’s
nuclear infrastructure, for example, predates that of U.S. involvement. Nuclear fuel
supply and construction initiatives already existed in Vietnam, and would continue to
exist even if the United States withdrew its support of the Vietnamese nuclear endeavor.
Without a 123 Agreement, U.S. influence in Vietnamese civilian nuclear infrastructure
would at best be minimal.
This lends credence to the notion that Congress repeatedly failed to amend
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 because it could not reach a consensus on
how to strengthen the American nonproliferation regime without sacrificing opportunities
for the U.S. to remain competitive in the development of civilian nuclear infrastructure in
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foreign states. If so, then it is likely that the U.S. will remain unable to achieve the “Gold
Standard”: a greater breadth in the number of countries signing 123 Agreements was
outlined in the Departments of State and Energy’s letter to Congress in 2012 as being a
key policy objective. 231 As a 123 Agreement is an authorization framework to allow the
transfer of nuclear facilities, materials, and technologies, the U.S. could choose to pursue
greater restrictions on top of the standard 123 Agreement with countries that it
determines require additional safeguards once the actual transfers are to take place.
A similar precedent is highlighted in the recently-announced Iran nuclear deal.
Among the concessions and requirements of the deal, Iran is to keep portions of its
enrichment capacity intact.232 Despite this unofficial validation of Iran’s enrichment
capabilities, President Barack Obama subsequently called the Iran deal “the strongest
non-proliferation agreement ever negotiated.”233 In labeling the deal as such, a shift in
negotiating priorities becomes evident: total bans on enrichment and reprocessing are
lifted in favor of other concessions, yet as an outcome of nuclear negotiations the deal is
stronger than the “Gold Standard.”
This departure from the “Gold Standard” will likely affect future 123 Agreements.
Countries within the international community are unlikely to accept greater restrictions
on their civilian nuclear infrastructures than were applied to rogue actors. Iran has
highlighted what nuclear-weapons states under the NPT have understood for decades: an
advanced nuclear infrastructure grants much greater leeway for negotiating with nuclear
powers. The rapid shift in U.S. nuclear negotiating policy between 2009 and 2012 as
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stated by the Departments of State and Energy likely signaled to foreign states that
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities were achievable under the right circumstances.
From 2012 to 2015, nuclear negotiations were dominated by two nuclear weapons
states and a rogue actor. In the cases of China, Russia, and Iran, advanced nuclear
infrastructures likely made maintaining enrichment and reprocessing capabilities
plausible outcomes for their respective negotiating teams. President Obama is somewhat
complicit in creating this atmosphere; his remarks that “no deal” with Iran would be
worse than the worst-case scenario under the JCPOA234 echoes statements made by the
administration during the Chinese 123 renegotiation, and will likely make future
negotiating partners unwilling to accept severe restrictions to their enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities.
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF SECTION 123 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
OF 1954

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 lists nine pledges by which partner countries
must abide. They are outlined as follows: 235
1. A guarantee of safeguards for all material and equipment – obtained, used,
and/or produced – provided subsequent to the conclusion of a nuclear
cooperation agreement. This guarantee is indefinite, and extends beyond
the natural or artificial lifetime of the treaty.
2. If the Party is a non-nuclear-weapons state, all nuclear material for any
peaceful purpose anywhere in the cooperating Party’s sovereign territory
must be subjected to IAEA safeguards. This includes material that is not
American in origin.
3. A guarantee that no material, equipment, or data will be used in the pursuit
of detonating a military nuclear device; or for any military purposes. An
exemption exists under subsection 91c of the Act for “nonnuclear parts of
atomic weapons” provided to states that have “made substantial progress
in the development of atomic weapons” so long as such a transfer does not
“contribute significantly to that nation’s atomic weapon design,
development, or fabrication capability.” 236
4. The United States will maintain the right to demand the return of any
nuclear materials and equipment transferred under the Agreement, and of
any material produced as a result of the Agreement, should the
235

“Atomic Energy Act of 1954”, As Amended (P.L. 83-703). Article 1, Chapter 11, Section 123. Accessed
July 7, 2015 via the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/governing-laws.html.
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Article 1, Chapter 9, Section 91, Subsection (c).
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cooperating Party detonate a nuclear device. Exemptions exist for
Agreements formed under subsection 91c (see point #3 above), and for
nuclear weapons states.
5. A guarantee that any materials transferred pursuant to the Agreement will
not be re-transferred to any unauthorized Party without the explicit
consent of the United States. The following exemptions may apply:
a. Subsection 91c (see point #3 above);
b. Subsection 144b: Authorization of the President to cooperate with
a nation or regional defense organization (where the United States
is a member), communicating restricted data for expressed
purposes of training, evaluation, defense planning, and developing
delivery systems. The President of the United States must
determine that such an arrangement “will not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security” of the
United States and the international community. This exemption
cannot be made independent of a 123 Agreement;237
c. Subsection 144c: Communication of restricted data to improve
atomic weapons design, provided that the cooperating Party has
made substantial progress in their development already.
Additionally, the communication of restricted data for military
reactors should they not constitute an unreasonable risk to the
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Article 1, Chapter 9, Section 144, Subsection (b).
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common defense and security. This exemption similarly cannot be
made independent of a 123 Agreement;238
d. Subsection 144d: The communication of restricted data to support
a program to control and account for fissile and weapons material;
“control of and accounting for atomic weapons”; verifying of
treaties; and establishing international standards for classifying
data related to atomic weapons and fissile material. This must
promote the common defense and security, and may not pose an
unreasonable risk to the same. Like Subsection 144b and 1441c
exemptions, this cannot be undertaken independent of a 123
Agreement.239
6. The cooperating Party must guarantee that nuclear materials produced or
received pursuant to this Agreement and relevant nuclear facilities will be
placed under adequate physical security.
7. A guarantee that no materials transferred or processed pursuant to this
Agreement will be reprocessed, enriched, “or otherwise altered” without
the expressed consent of the United States. Exemptions exist under
subsections 91c (see point #3 above), 144b, 144c, and 144d (see point #5
above, sub-bullets (b), (c), and (d) respectively).
8. A guarantee by the cooperating Party that plutonium, U 233, and uranium
enriched above 20% U235 transferred or produced pursuant to this
Agreement will not be stored in any facility without the expressed, prior
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Article 1, Chapter 9, Section 144, Subsection (c).
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Article 1, Chapter 9, Section 144, Subsection (d).
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approval of the United States. Exemptions exist under subsections 91c
(see point #3 above), 144b, 144c, and 144d (see point #5 above, subbullets (b), (c), and (d) respectively).
9. A guarantee that all materials, data, facilities, and equipment transferred,
and any material produced using the aforementioned transfers, will be
subjected to all requirements laid out in Section 123. The President may
make exemptions under subsections 91c (see point #3 above), 144b, 144c,
and 144d (see point #5 above, sub-bullets (b), (c), and (d) respectively), if
such an exemption would prevent jeopardizing either the common defense
and security, or American nonproliferation goals.
a. Except in the cases of the aforementioned exemptions, the
Secretary of State will be the primary negotiator for a 123
Agreement.
b. Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements must include a
classified annex with the consultation of the Director of Central
Intelligence to summarize relevant, classified information. An
unclassified version shall be provided to the President analyzing
the consistency of the proposed treaty with the requirements of
Section 123, and analyzing the safeguards and control mechanisms
of the cooperating Party.
c. Under the aforementioned exemptions, proposals will be submitted
by either the Secretary of Energy or the Secretary of Defense, as
applicable.
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